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PREEMPTION
Executive Order by the Governor to Ensure a Safe & Healthy
Georgia: Preemption
GEORGIA CONSTITUTION:
CODE SECTIONS:
EXECUTIVE ORDER:
EFFECTIVE DATE:
SUMMARY:

GA. CONST. art. III, § 6
O.C.G.A. §§ 38-3-51; 45-12-30
Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01
April 2, 2020
The doctrine of preemption expresses
the idea that “a higher authority of law
will displace a lower authority of law
when the two authorities come into
conflict.”1 Preemption exists on both
the federal and state level. According
to the Georgia Constitution, local laws
are permissible if they do not conflict
with the state law on the subject.2
During a Public Health State of
Emergency, the Governor of Georgia
maintains certain expanded powers to
take necessary action for the health and
safety of the public.3 On April 2, 2020,
Governor Brian Kemp (R) used these
expanded powers to enact an Executive
Order that preempted local Georgia
Orders related to the COVID-19
pandemic.4

1. Preemption,
CORNELL
L.
SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/Preemption
[https://perma.cc/9DXN-EEM9].
2. GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 6.
3. Memorandum from Georgia Gov.’s Office on the Pub. Health State of Emergency to Members
of the Georgia Gen. Assemb. (Mar. 15, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University Law Review)
[hereinafter Memorandum from Georgia Gov.].
4. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, at 8 (Apr. 2, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University
Law Review).
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Introduction
Amidst chaos and fear, as the COVID-19 pandemic spread
throughout the country and the world, leaders on the local, state, and
federal levels faced the challenge of deciding how to best protect
their citizens. On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization
designated COVID-19 a global pandemic as concerns about the virus
surged across the nation, and the death toll surpassed 100,000
worldwide.5 Two days later on March 13, 2020, President Donald
Trump (R) declared a national emergency to address the spread of
COVID-19 in the United States.6 As the days passed and the virus
continued to spread, President Trump issued Executive Orders
regarding the allocation of medical resources and an Order designed
to prevent the hoarding of medical supplies.7 Like the President’s
Executive Orders, leaders such as Georgia’s Governor Brian Kemp
(R) and local leaders such as Mayor Shirley Sessions of Tybee
Island, Georgia, issued their own Orders to protect their citizens and
communities.8
Governor Kemp declared a Public Health State of Emergency for
the State of Georgia one day after President Trump declared a
national emergency.9 Governor Kemp’s declaration marked
Georgia’s first-ever public health emergency, which granted the
Governor additional powers beyond a general state of emergency. 10
After hours of debate, Georgia lawmakers ratified Governor Kemp’s
additional and expanded powers, which included authority to extend
the Public Health State of Emergency without their further approval,
but the decision was not an easy one.11 One concern, expressed by
5. Jamie Ducharme, World Health Organization Declares COVID-19 a ‘Pandemic.’ Here’s What
that Means, TIME (Mar. 11, 2020, 12:39 PM), https://time.com/5791661/who-coronavirus-pandemicdeclaration/ [https://perma.cc/4TGW-CFMG].
6. Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 13, 2020).
7. Exec. Order No. 13,909, 85 Fed. Reg. 56 (Mar. 23, 2020); Exec. Order No. 13,910, 85 Fed. Reg.
59 (Mar. 23, 2020).
8. Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.14.20.01 (Mar. 14, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University Law
Review); Tybee Island, Ga., Ordinance 2020-14 (Apr. 2, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State
University Law Review).
9. Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.14.20.01, supra note 8.
10. Memorandum from Georgia Gov., supra note 3.
11. Jill Nolin, Lawmakers Grant Kemp Expanded Powers in Public Health Emergency, GA.
RECORDER (Mar. 16, 2020), https://georgiarecorder.com/2020/03/16/lawmakers-grant-kemp-expanded-
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State Representative Bert Reeves (R-34th), was what would happen
if too many lawmakers became sick and could not vote on whether
Governor Kemp’s powers should continue without their approval.12
While Governor Kemp’s expanded emergency powers enjoyed
bipartisan support within the legislature, interest groups such as the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Georgia expressed
concerns.13 Andrea Young, Executive Director of the ACLU of
Georgia, noted the Governor’s emergency powers lacked additional
oversight and transparency.14
Background
Preemption
Preemption is the legal doctrine that recognizes that a higher level
of government can limit or eliminate “the power of a lower level of
government to regulate a certain issue.”15 Preemption comes in
several forms. Express preemption describes when a law explicitly
states that it “preempt[s] a lower-level law-making authority.”16
Implied preemption does not include explicit preemptive language
but occurs if the higher-level law comprehensively regulates the issue
or if the lower-level law interferes with the goal of the higher-level
law.17 In addition, preemption varies based on how mild or
concerning the form of preemption may be.18 Floor preemption, the

powers-in-public-health-emergency/ [https://perma.cc/NY6P-8ER7].
12. Id.
13. Greg Bluestein & Maya T. Prabhu, Georgia Lawmakers Grant Kemp Vast New Powers to
Combat Coronavirus, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/blog/politics/georgialawmakers-poised-give-kemp-new-powers-combat-coronavirus/IBjcf2rXIGecEI1SpFhesK/
[https://perma.cc/X8SV-B3ZQ].
14. Id.
15. PUB. HEALTH L. & POL’Y, FUNDAMENTALS OF PREEMPTION 1 (2010),
https://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/nplan-fs-fundamentals-2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LX5B-2WP7].
16. Id. at 2. Preemptive intent can be worded in many ways. CHANGELAB SOLUTIONS, PREEMPTION
BY ANY OTHER NAME: WORDS AND PHRASES INDICATING PREEMPTIVE INTENT 1 (2013),
https://www.changelabsolutions.org/sites/default/files/Preemption_OtherName_FS_FINAL_20130911.p
df [https://perma.cc/H2PM-K63M].
17. PUB. HEALTH L. & POL’Y, supra note 15, at 2.
18. Id. at 2.
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mildest form of preemption, occurs “where the higher level of
government passes a law that establishes a minimum set of
requirements, and expressly allows lower levels of government to
pass or enforce laws that impose more rigorous requirements.”19
Ceiling preemption prevents lower levels of governments “from
requiring anything more or different.”20 Preemption is a tool that, if
used effectively, can make higher-level government responses more
effective.
Historically, the Georgia Constitutions of 1945 and 1976 contained
uniformity clauses, which stated that “[l]aws of a general nature shall
have uniform operation through the State, and no special law shall be
enacted in any case for which provision has been made by existing
general law.”21 The Supreme Court of Georgia interpreted that
uniformity clause provision as both a preemption rule and a conflict
rule.22 Thus, there were two opposing ways to read the uniformity
clause. According to the preemption analysis, if the legislature
“entered a field by enacting a general law,” that field was not open to
regulation by special or local laws.23 Under the conflict analysis,
special laws were only prohibited if they were in “genuine conflict”
with a general law.24 “Based on these differing interpretations, it was
unclear whether the uniformity clause preempted any special or local
law when the [S]tate had passed a general law on the subject or
whether [the clause] merely prohibited conflicts between general and
local laws.”25
The Georgia Constitution of 1983 resolved this interpretation
issue, granting local governments “concurrent jurisdiction with the
state to exercise certain police powers in areas of concern to both.”26
The current Georgia Constitution uniformity clause states:
19. Id. at 3.
20. Id.
21. GA. CONST. of 1945, art. I, § 4, para. 1; GA. CONST. of 1976, art. I, § 2, para. 7.
22. Franklin Cnty. v. Fieldale Farms Corp., 270 Ga. 272, 274, 507 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1998).
23. Id. A general law preempts local or special laws or ordinances on the same subject and applies
uniformly throughout the entire state, whereas a special law is a municipal ordinance that deals with
matters covered by the general law and has the same effect as a local law enacted by the state
legislature. Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. City of Atlanta, 253 Ga. App. 713, 718, 560 S.E.2d 525, 529 (2002).
24. Franklin Cnty., 270 Ga. at 274, 507 S.E.2d at 462.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 274–75, 507 S.E.2d at 462.
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Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation
throughout this state and no local or special law shall be
enacted in any case for which provision has been made by
an existing general law, except that the General Assembly
may by general law authorize local governments by local
ordinance or resolution to exercise police powers which do
not conflict with general laws.27
Thus, under the Georgia Constitution, local laws are preempted by
state laws that regulate the same subject matter. However, if the local
law does not conflict with the state law and the state law so
authorizes, the local government may act despite the state law.
Sometimes a state law “occupies a field” so that a local order is
preempted even if the state law “insufficiently achieves essential
public health outcomes.”28 When a state statute occupies such an area
of the law, Georgia courts uniformly strike local ordinances that take
more restrictive actions than are permissible per the statute. As
explained by Georgia courts, however, laws are not conflicting so
long as “the local law does not impair the general law, but rather
augments and strengthens it.”29
For example, in Hill v. Tschannen, the court addressed whether a
local ordinance was preempted by state statute. 30 The statute required
apartment buildings to have a battery-operated smoke detector in
good working order, whereas the local Ordinance only required
smoke detectors powered by the building’s electrical system. 31 The
court held that the local Ordinance was preempted by the state statute
because the Ordinance conflicted with and provided stricter

27. GA. CONST. art. 3, § 6, para. 4.
28. James G. Hodge Jr. & Alicia Corbett, Legal Preemption and the Prevention of Chronic
Conditions,
13:E85
PREVENTING
CHRONIC
DISEASE
1,
2
(2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2016/pdf/16_0121.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7RA-TF6P].
29. Hill v. Tschannen, 264 Ga. App. 288, 291, 590 S.E.2d 133, 135 (2003); see also Grovenstein v.
Effingham Cnty., 262 Ga. 45, 47, 414 S.E.2d 207, 210 (1992) (finding an Effingham County local
Ordinance did not impede operation of state law where it prohibited the sale of alcohol to minors under
circumstances more specific than those provided by state law).
30. Hill, 264 Ga. App. at 290, 590 S.E.2d at 134.
31. Id.
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requirements than the state statute, hindering the operation of the
state law rather than strengthening it. 32
Tybee Island’s Emergency Directive & Beach Ordinance
On March 19, 2020, Governor Brian Kemp (R) recommended that
local officials take action to keep their communities safe from the
spread of COVID-19 and “make decisions based on what their
communities’ needs were.”33 In Tybee Island, a small beach town
known for large gatherings and socializing, local leaders took this
call very seriously. Without enough “enforcement officers to do
anything about most of the activities [the mayor of Tybee Island] was
seeing,” along with additional factors such as underage drinking that
could lead to increased spread of the virus, the mayor and city
council decided to close the beach. 34 The mayor issued the Tybee
Island Emergency Directive (Directive) on March 20, 2020, closing
all the beaches on the island to keep citizens safe and healthy.35 One
day later, Hilton Head, Saint Simons, and Jekyll Island followed
Tybee’s lead and closed their beaches as well.36 Mayor Shirley
Sessions hoped that closing Tybee’s beaches would allow residents
to “get back to some sort of normal and welcome people back to the
beach once [Tybee] got past the [COVID-19] issues.”37
On April 2, 2020, Mayor Sessions issued an Emergency
Declaration and Ordinance (Declaration), which took immediate
effect to protect the safety and health of Tybee’s constituents.38 The
Declaration established a local state of emergency in Tybee Island
that would continue to exist “until the conditions requiring this
32. Id. at 291, 590 S.E.2d at 135.
33. Telephone Interview with Mayor Shirley Sessions, Mayor of Tybee Island, Ga. (May 27, 2020)
(on file with the Georgia State University Law Review) [hereinafter Mayor Sessions Interview].
Although many Georgia cities and towns were affected by Governor Kemp’s executive orders, this
Peach Sheet focuses specifically on Tybee Island due to the national media attention received when the
island’s local legislation was preempted and Tybee’s beaches were reopened by Governor Kemp.
34. Id.
35. Tybee Island, Ga., Emergency Directive (Mar. 20, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State
University Law Review) [hereinafter Tybee Emergency Directive].
36. See Mayor Sessions Interview, supra note 33.
37. Id.
38. Tybee Island, Ga., Ordinance 2020-14 (Apr. 2, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University
Law Review).
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declaration [were] abated.”39 The Declaration limited city council
meetings to virtual teleconferences and closed all nonessential
businesses and dine-in services; it also listed previous directives for
clarity, including the Directive that closed all public beaches for the
foreseeable future.40 On April 2, Governor Kemp issued an Executive
Order superseding these local Orders, which shocked local leaders.41
While the Governor’s Order restricted dining rooms, barbershops,
and gyms across the State of Georgia, the Order opened the beaches
of Tybee Island to the public.42 Mayor Sessions described her initial
reaction to the Order as shocked and disappointed, and stated that she
“did not understand why someone did not communicate why the state
was taking such a direct and drastic turn . . . .”43
Mayor Sessions explained that learning about Governor Kemp’s
announcement through a press release “was very disappointing.”44
She had no “heads up, [no] phone calls, no letters, no email ahead of
time” to warn her, and she “had to learn like everybody else,” leaving
her unsure of how to react.45 Although localities like Tybee Island
were still able to regulate use of the beaches by prohibiting umbrellas
and tents, as well as banning possession or consumption of alcohol,
Georgians would be free to visit and roam the beaches as they
pleased.46
Georgia Governor’s Executive Order
On March 14, 2020, Governor Brian Kemp (R) declared a Public
Health State of Emergency in Georgia due to the magnitude and
spread of COVID-19.47 Declaring a state of emergency conferred
39. Id. at 2.
40. Id. at 4; see also Tybee Emergency Directive, supra note 35.
41. See Mayor Sessions Interview, supra note 33; Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 4.
42. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 4, at 6, 8; Rick Rojas, In Georgia, Shelter-in-Place
Order Closes Businesses and Reopens Beaches, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2UJM1BS
[https://perma.cc/K6KA-49KN].
43. See Mayor Sessions Interview, supra note 33.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Governor’s Shelter in Place Order: What It Means for Tybee, CITY OF TYBEE ISLAND, GA. (Apr.
4, 2020), https://www.cityoftybee.org/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=550&ARC= [https://perma.cc/2WX9GK7K].
47. Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.14.20.01, supra note 8. A public health emergency is defined as “the
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certain powers upon Governor Kemp, including, but not limited to,
enforcing laws related to emergency management, performing duties
necessary to protect the population, and using available state
resources to manage the emergency.48 During a Public Health State
of Emergency, the Governor has the authority “[t]o compel a health
care facility to provide services[,] . . . . to implement a mandatory
vaccination or quarantine program[,] . . . . [and] [t]o direct the
Department of Public Health to coordinate” the state’s response to
the threat.49 According to Jonathan Todres, Distinguished University
Professor and Professor of Law of the Georgia State University
College of Law’s Center for Law, Health & Society, “the
circumstances around COVID-19 clearly warranted a public health
emergency declaration, which, if well-executed, could have helped
ensure a coordinated, effective response” among both relevant
agencies and the levels of government.50
According to the Governor’s office, Governor Kemp used his
expanded emergency powers in March to implement measures
targeted to slow the spread of the virus and protect vulnerable
populations. The administration achieved this by closing schools;
implementing teleworking policies; authorizing temporary licenses
for out-of-state doctors, nurses, and pharmacists; and increasing the
state stockpile of personal protective equipment. 51 Pursuant to Code
section 38-3-51, the Governor has the authority to renew the
emergency declaration and keep the Public Health State of

occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition that is reasonably believed to be caused
by bioterrorism or the appearance of a novel . . . infectious agent.” Memorandum from Georgia Gov.,
supra note 3.
48. Memorandum from Georgia Gov., supra note 3; see also Janelle Alleyne et al., Coronavirus:
Georgia Governor Declares Public Health Emergency to Combat COVID-19, JD SUPRA (Mar. 24,
2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/coronavirus-georgia-governor-declares-11516/
[https://perma.cc/4XQH-5FKP].
49. Memorandum from Georgia Gov., supra note 3; see also Alleyne et al., supra note 48.
50. Electronic Mail Interview with Professor Jonathan Todres, Distinguished Univ. Professor and
Professor of L., Ga. State Univ. Coll. of L. (June 18, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University
Law Review) [hereinafter Todres Interview].
51. Press Release, Brian P. Kemp, Gov. of Georgia, Gov. Kemp Issues New Executive Orders,
Provides COVID-19 Update (Mar. 23, 2020), https://gov.georgia.gov/press-releases/2020-03-23/govkemp-issues-new-executive-orders-provides-covid-19-update [https://perma.cc/YT2N-6UDC].
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Emergency in effect until the Governor determines “the threat or
danger has ended.”52
Although the Governor commonly uses Executive Orders to create
advisory commissions and address management and administrative
issues, Governor Kemp used his emergency powers to issue several
Executive Orders to contain the spread of COVID-19.53 Notably,
Governor Kemp’s Executive Order 04.02.20.01 preempted all local
ordinances, including the Georgia coastal communities’ beach
closures in March. 54 The Order declared that enforcement of any
local ordinance issued since March 1, 2020, would be suspended if
such Order or ordinance conflicted or differed with the terms of the
Executive Order.55
According to Code section 38-3-51(d)(1), the Governor’s
emergency powers include the power to “[s]uspend any regulatory
statute prescribing the procedures for conduct of state business . . . if
strict compliance with any statute, order, rule, or regulation would in
any way prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action in coping with the
emergency or disaster.”56 In this case, Code section 38-3-51(d)(1)
can be interpreted to permit the Governor to use his Executive Order
authority to effectively supersede prior local ordinances in the State
of Georgia.57 In addition, pursuant to Code section 45-12-30, the
Governor has the power in emergencies to prevent violence and
maintain order if the citizens of the state are threatened.58 Therefore,
Code section 45-12-30, if construed broadly, also granted the

52. O.C.G.A. § 38-3-51 (2012 & Supp. 2020); see also Benjamin Della Roca et al., State Emergency
Authorities
to
Address
COVID-19,
LAWFARE
(May
4,
2020,
3:03
PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/state-emergency-authorities-address-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/A3EYUFDM].
53. See Ga. Exec. Order Nos. 04.08.2020.01–05 (Apr. 8, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State
University Law Review); Ga. Exec. Order Nos. 04.30.2020.01–02 (Apr. 30, 2020) (on file with the
Georgia State University Law Review); Ga. Exec. Order Nos. 05.28.2020.01–02 (May 28, 2020) (on file
with the Georgia State University Law Review); see also Governors’ Powers & Authority, NAT’L
GOVERNORS ASS’N, https://www.nga.org/consulting-2/powers-and-authority/ [https://perma.cc/766YDF3Z].
54. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 4.
55. Id.
56. § 38-3-51(d)(1).
57. Id.
58. O.C.G.A. § 45-12-30 (2016).
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Governor power to enforce the Executive Orders to maintain order
during the COVID-19 Public Health State of Emergency.59
A Public Health Law Perspective on Local Preemption
During a pandemic, the Governor and senior officials have the
authority and responsibility to protect the public’s health, maintain
critical services and state infrastructure, and shape the recovery
process.60 It is important for the Governor and senior officials to
coordinate with local government to prepare effective responses. 61
According to Professor Todres, “in a pandemic, it can be more
difficult to develop an effective response if different jurisdictions are
adopting very different responses. Consistency across jurisdictions
can be important, but it also can constrain local authorities.”62 When
Governor Kemp issued Executive Order 04.02.20.01, preempting the
local ordinances of Georgia municipalities, including Tybee Island,
many local officials and members of the public were outraged. 63
Before issuing the Order, Governor Kemp failed to inform local
officials of his intent to include the preemption provision.64 Governor
Kemp’s staff, along with supportive members of the public, believed
59. Id.
60. Richard Thompson Ford, Why Counties Are Handling the Coronavirus Better than Trump,
SLATE (Apr. 13, 2020, 1:32 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/04/local-governmentcoronavirus-federalism.html [https://perma.cc/BDJ2-HQKB].
61. Id.
62. Todres Interview, supra note 50; see also Who Calls the Shots During a Pandemic, the U.S.
Government or States? Q&A with RAND Experts, RAND CORP.: THE RAND BLOG (Apr. 16, 2020),
https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/04/who-calls-the-shots-during-a-pandemic-the-us-government.html
[https://perma.cc/6BHP-AEZA]. RAND researcher, Rebecca Haffajee stated:
The challenge here is that with other public health issues, or infectious diseases, the
speed with which exposure can spread and the harm from exposure may be different.
COVID-19 is quite efficient at traveling quickly across country, state, and town lines,
and it inflicts a lot of harm.
That makes it really challenging when we have one town reacting one way and
right next door another town reacting in another way. There’s no way their actions
don’t affect each other.
Id.
63. Greg Bluestein, Kemp Allies Defend Reopening Georgia Beaches Despite Coastal Criticism,
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/blog/politics/kemp-allies-defend-decisionreopen-georgia-beaches-despite-coastal-pushback/FLFtv9dKzl2VfXupvJ9XmL/
[https://perma.cc/MAV6-UV75].
64. Id.
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that the social distancing required by the Order and law enforcement
patrols were adequate protective measures to allow Georgia’s
beaches to reopen.65
Disagreements between local and state government affect
decision-making and coordination at the state level:
It is critical for any leader—whether at the federal or state
level—to work with local jurisdictions. . . . There may be
disagreements, but . . . declarations at the state level need
local support to ensure successful implementation. . . . [I]t
is still important for those levels of government to solicit
input from localities and have open lines of
communication.66
In a few states, Governors enacted regulatory stay-at-home Orders
acting as floors that allowed local governments to pursue tighter
measures on their own.67 In states such as Georgia, Florida, South
Carolina, and Texas, stay-at-home Orders acted as regulatory
ceilings, preventing local efforts to impose stricter requirements than
the State wanted to enact.68 In declaring the local preemption,
Governor Kemp stressed that “local action [could not] be taken that
is more or less restrictive” than the State’s Order.69

65. Id.
66. Todres Interview, supra note 50.
67. Nestor M. Davidson & Kim Haddow, State Preemption and Local Responses in the Pandemic,
AM. CONST. SOC’Y (June 22, 2020), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/state-preemption-and-localresponses-in-the-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/95FS-NHCZ].
68. Id.
69. Press Release, Brian P. Kemp, Gov. of Georgia, Gov. Kemp Updates Georgians on COVID-19
(Apr. 20, 2020), https://gov.georgia.gov/press-releases/2020-04-20/gov-kemp-updates-georgians-covid19 [https://perma.cc/P7ET-GE3G].
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Analysis
The Governor’s Executive Order Expressly Preempted the Local
Ordinance
Whereas the federal government is, in many instances, restrained
by the principles of federalism from exercising direct control over
state governments, state governments are the grantors of the powers
held by cities, counties, and other municipal creations of the state. 70
The power granted to municipalities can be withdrawn or subject to
stringent conditions that govern how locales can act in response to an
issue.71
Mayor Shirley Sessions’s Directive denied the public access to the
beaches in Tybee Island completely.72 Under the Directive, “the
beaches of the Island and access thereto [would] be closed to the
public commencing March 20, 2020, at 9:00 AM.”73 This limitation
conflicted with Governor Brian Kemp’s (R) Executive Order
04.02.20.01 because the Directive provided a stricter requirement for
the public. The Executive Order expressly stated that local
ordinances would be preempted if they pertained to the pandemic
unless the local ordinance enforced compliance with the Order.74
Governor Kemp’s Order suspended “any local ordinance or order
adopted or issued since March 1, 2020, with the stated purpose or
effect of responding to a public health state of emergency . . . that in
any way conflicts, varies, or differs from the terms of this Order.”75
Because the Directive was put in place to respond to the Public
Health State of Emergency and provided more restrictive guidelines
regarding beach use than Executive Order 04.02.20.01, the Directive
conflicted with the Executive Order rather than augment or
strengthen it.76 Under these circumstances, the express preemption
effectively rescinded the guidelines established in the Directive.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Hodge Jr. & Corbett, supra note 28, at 1.
Id.
Tybee Emergency Directive, supra note 35.
Id.
Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 4.
Id.
Tybee Emergency Directive, supra note 35.
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In a very similar fashion, the Georgia Court of Appeals found in
Hill v. Tschannen that a local Macon Ordinance regarding the
maintenance of smoke detectors in apartment buildings was
preempted by Georgia law because the Ordinance provided more
restrictive guidelines than the state statute. 77 The court held that the
Macon Ordinance would hinder the operation of state law, as
opposed to augmenting or strengthening it, because the Ordinance
essentially rendered the state regulations insufficient by requiring
stricter standards that apartment complexes needed to abide by.78
Given the doctrine of preemption and the wealth of case law
preempting the enforcement of local laws that conflict with state
laws, the result here could likely be foreseen, even though the results
of preemption may have been upsetting to local leaders such as
Mayor Sessions.79
Local Preemption Debate Growing in Georgia
Executive Order 04.02.20.01 was not the only Order issued by
Governor Kemp that effectively rejected Orders issued by local
officials and city councils. Since the Order preempted the Tybee
Island beach closure Ordinance in the early spring, Atlanta Mayor
Keisha Lance Bottoms (D) and Governor Kemp debated the legality
of the Executive Order preempting local mandatory masks Orders.80
77. Hill v. Tschannen, 264 Ga. App. 288, 291, 590 S.E.2d 133, 135 (2003).
78. Id.
79. Madeleine Carlisle, Georgia Gov. Brian Kemp Sued to Block Atlanta’s Face Mask Ordinance.
Here’s What to Know, TIME (July 18, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://time.com/5868613/georgia-governorbrian-kemp-face-mask-atlanta-keisha-lance-bottoms/ [https://perma.cc/GE85-KPLB].
80. Vanessa Romo, Georgia Gov. Brian Kemp Sues Atlanta Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms Over
Face Mask Order, NPR (July 16, 2020, 7:19 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-liveupdates/2020/07/16/892109883/georgia-gov-brian-kemp-sues-atlanta-mayor-keisha-lance-bottomsover-face-mask-or [https://perma.cc/PWQ8-DMDR]. This was not the first time Mayor Bottoms and
Governor Kemp have encountered differences in opinions in handling the pandemic. James Hohmann,
The Daily 202: Reopening Debate Pits Mayors Against Governors. Atlanta vs. Georgia is a Preview,
WASHINGTON
POST
(Apr.
24,
2020,
11:40
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/daily-202/2020/04/24/daily-202-reopeningdebate-pits-mayors-against-governors-atlanta-vs-georgia-is-a-preview/5ea271f8602ff14af7434165/
[https://perma.cc/9SLL-RAMA]. Mayor Bottoms criticized Governor Kemp’s Executive Order
04.23.20.02, which allowed business such as gyms, bowling alleys, barbershops, and more to reopen in
Atlanta and throughout the state. Id.; see also Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.23.20.02 (Apr. 23, 2020) (on file
with the Georgia State University Law Review). Importantly, Mayor Bottoms conceded that “[Governor
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On July 8, July 10, and July 13, 2020, Mayor Bottoms issued City of
Atlanta Executive Orders 2020-113, 2020-114, and 2020-115,
respectively, ordering the mandatory use of masks in the Atlanta. 81
Subsequently, on July 15, 2020, Governor Kemp issued a statewide
COVID-19 directive encouraging, rather than mandating, the wearing
of face coverings by Georgians. 82
Tensions and conflict between the State and Atlanta elevated when
Governor Kemp filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Fulton
County on July 16, 2020, seeking to “enjoin Mayor Bottoms and the
City Council of Atlanta from enforcement of Mayor Bottoms[‘s]
COVID-related executive orders and enjoin the City Council of
Atlanta from enacting any ordinances that [were] inconsistent with
any COVID-related executive order.”83 The lawsuit alleged that the
Mayor’s mask directives were inconsistent with the Governor’s
Executive Orders and thus were preempted.84 This debate was
heavily discussed by legal experts across the State of Georgia.85
According to Cathy Cox, Dean of the Mercer University School of
Law, “municipalities have broad emergency powers under Georgia
law, . . . but that same law says that cities cannot use their powers to
do anything that is ‘inconsistent’ with an order issued by the
governor.”86 To the contrary, Professor Clark Cunningham, Georgia
Kemp’s] authority as governor is what it is, and it certainly supersedes my authority as mayor on
paper . . . .” Hohmann, supra.
81. City of Atlanta Exec. Order No. 2020-113 (July 8, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State
University Law Review); City of Atlanta Exec. Order No. 2020-14 (July 10, 2020) (on file with the
Georgia State University Law Review); City of Atlanta Exec. Order No. 2020-115 (July 13, 2020) (on
file with the Georgia State University Law Review).
82. Ga. Exec. Order No. 07.15.20.01 (July 15, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University Law
Review).
83. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9, Kemp v. Bottoms, No. 2020CV338387,
2020 WL 4036827 (Ga. Super. Ct. July 16, 2020) [hereinafter Mask Mandate Complaint]. Several other
Georgia cities have issued similar mask ordinances, but the Governor’s lawsuit only addresses Atlanta.
Michael King, Lawyers for Mayor Bottoms File Brief Responding to Gov. Kemp’s Mask Lawsuit,
11ALIVE (July 27, 2020, 6:47 PM), https://www.11alive.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/lawyersfor-mayor-bottoms-file-brief-responding-to-gov-kemps-lawsuit/85-6cb8e0fc-f8a6-4621-9cd5a6f47ab83330.
84. Mask Mandate Complaint, supra note 83; Kemp v. Bottoms Unmasked: Emergency Powers and
State
Preemption,
NETWORK
FOR
PUB.
HEALTH
L.
(July
23,
2020),
https://www.networkforphl.org/news-insights/kemp-v-bottoms-unmasked-emergency-powers-and-statepreemption/ [https://perma.cc/2KM9-45KB].
85. Carlisle, supra note 79.
86. Id.
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State University College of Law W. Lee Burge Chair of Law &
Ethics and Professor of Law, explained Mayor Bottoms could argue
“that the order preventing her from mandating face masks was
contrary to Kemp’s declaration of a public health emergency.”87
Since the filing of the lawsuit, the parties have entered mediation as
ordered by Fulton County Superior Court Judge Jane Barwick.88
Similarly to Executive Order 04.02.20.01’s express preemption of
more restrictive local ordinances, Executive Order 07.15.20.01
expressly preempted Mayor Bottoms’s mandatory mask Order. The
Order stated that: “Any . . . county, or municipal law, order,
ordinance, rule or regulation that requires persons to wear face
coverings, masks, face shields, or any other Personal Protective
Equipment while in places of public accommodation or on public
property are suspended to the extent they are more restrictive than
this Executive Order.”89 It is clear that the Governor’s Order did not
mandate citizens to wear masks; therefore, Mayor Bottoms’s Order
requiring the use of masks in the City of Atlanta would be “more
restrictive” and conflict with the Governor’s Order.90 Additionally,
Code section 38-3-51 likely supports Governor Kemp’s Order
preempting more restrictive mask mandates by granting the Governor
additional authority when dealing with a Public Health State of
Emergency.91
The outcome of this lawsuit will affect every other city in Georgia
because it will establish whether city officials have the authority to
impose contradicting or more restrictive mandates than the
Governor’s Executive Orders on issues related to this pandemic. This
lawsuit and these local preemption debates shine a light on the
importance of consistency and coordination between state and local
governments.

87. Id.
88. Rich McKay, Georgia’s Governor and Atlanta’s Mayor Ordered to Mediate Coronavirus Mask
Fight, REUTERS (July 23, 2020, 8:05 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usageorgia/georgias-governor-and-atlantas-mayor-ordered-to-mediate-coronavirus-mask-fightidUSKCN24P002.
89. Ga. Exec. Order No. 07.15.20.01, supra note 82, at 32.
90. Id.; City of Atlanta Exec. Order No. 2020-113, supra note 81.
91. O.C.G.A. § 38-3-51(d)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2020).
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Conclusion
The Public Health State of Emergency, the first of its kind in
Georgia, brought preemption issues to the forefront of Georgia
politics. Georgians and government officials, along with the rest of
the country, will hopefully continue to work together and do their
best to navigate the COVID-19 pandemic. As state and local
government officials grapple with how best to handle the pandemic
for Georgia, Professor Todres reminds us that “ultimately, as this
pandemic has shown, it is critical for all entities at the federal, state,
and local levels to invest in preparedness. . . . It was, and still is,
critical that everyone works together to adopt measures that will
flatten the curve and, ultimately, dramatically reduce if not eliminate
COVID-19.”92
Marisa P. Ahlzadeh & Fanny Chac

92. Todres Interview, supra note 50.
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